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Abstract: This study discusses the discourse on democracy 
within the context of the larger debate on Islam-state 
relations in Indonesia and correlates the religious approach 
with theories of democracy. It  begins with a brief 
description of types of democracy formulated by political 
scientists in order to help us classify the Islamic groups’ 
efforts in the process of democratization in Indonesia. This 
is followed by an exploration of these groups’ views of 
democracy and their classification on the basis of their 
religious approach. The study considers both the debate 
about Islam-state relations and democracy as a competitive 
process over the interpretation of the predominant Islamic 
doctrine among the silent majority of the people. This 
study will also explore the role which Islam should play in 
the process of democratization. I will argue that the 
compatibility of Islam with democracy and democratization 
in the modern sense depends on the identification of 
universal values. 
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Introduction 
The emergence of Islam or “Islamization” in Indonesian politics 
during the 1990s has invited much criticism. This criticism relates not 
only to the problematic relationship between Islam and the state, but 
also to the discourse of democracy. One example of how the state has 
become connected with the deepening Islamization of Indonesia is the 
so-called “politics of accommodation”.1 The most vocal, trenchant 
                                                 
1 Realizing that political Islam was no longer a threat, the New Order regime began to 
treat it sympathetically by implementing a number of policies thought to agree with 
Islamic socio-cultural and political interests ―e.g., the passing of the Religious Court 
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criticism of the politics of accommodation has come from 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the former of chairman of the rural-based 
Islamic organization called Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the former 
president of Indonesia. 
Bahtiar Effendy recorded that according to Abdurrahman Wahid, 
“The state, to some extent, exacerbates these tendencies by involving 
itself in issues related to religious affairs, especially those which 
concern the interest of the Islamic majority.” For Wahid, the 
ramifications of these practices could be very damaging. At stake are 
the principles of pluralism and national integration. Elaborating on this 
alarming possibility, he said: 
Other than representing a discriminatory move toward 
religions adhered to by the minority [groups], the excessive 
intervention [of the state in religion] could eventually 
weaken the integration of the nation. Indonesia is not a 
theocratic state. Accordingly, the ruling government must 
set clear limits in administrating and protecting religious 
life. The essential meaning of democracy is to protect and 
defend the rights of minority. If for some reason the state 
or government is more concerned with the interest of a 
certain religion, or only accepting the truth from a certain 
religion, it suggests that the state is leaning toward 
sectarianism.2 
This description shows us that Wahid’s rationale was based on 
democratic pillars (such as the principle of pluralism and the 
protection of minority rights).  
Amien Rais, the former chairman of People’s Consultative 
Assembly, expressed a view that differed from Wahid’s conception of 
democracy and democratization. He said that the political struggle of 
Islamic groups to build a civil society should be democratic. In his 
opinion, “The essential meaning of democracy is to provide the 
sovereignty for the people, and their aspirations should be manifested 
                                                                                                      
law (1989), the founding of ICMI (1990), the compilation of Islamic law (1991), the 
issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree on the guidance of zakat administrator 
(BAZIS), the holding of an Islamic cultural festival (1991), the establishment of the 
Islamic Bank (1992), and the annulment of the national lottery (1993). Cf. Bahtiar 
Effendy, “Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and 
Practices in Indonesia,” Ph.D. Dissertation. The Ohio State University, 1994. 
2 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 359-360. 
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both at the level of the executive and at the level of the legislative.”3 
Rais regretted that while Muslims formed the majority in Indonesia, 
they did not receive proportionate attention for their economic or 
political development in the last twenty-five years of the New Order. 
He added that it is necessary for Muslims as a majority in this country 
to be well represented at both the legislative and the executive.4 
The illustration presented above shows clearly that there is no 
single view among Muslims regarding Islam-state relations and its 
relation to democracy and democratization. One view is that in order 
to create democracy, one must collaborate with the government and 
promote democratic rules from within for people’s sovereignty and 
government accountability. Another view is that democracy begins 
with the strengthening of democratic attitudes at the grassroots level 
through the promotion of democratic principles like freedom of 
expression, equality before the law, egalitarianism, and inclusive 
participation. 
The problem is how to explain the Islamic groups’ activities within 
the process of democratization in Indonesia. Are their efforts 
consistent with the workings of democracy? Why do they differ in 
their commitments to democracy? What is their major difference? Is 
one group better than the other? Are there many ways to build a 
democracy? 
Few studies have been concerned with these themes. The 
following scholars have conducted research on either Islam-state or 
Islam-democracy relations in Indonesia: Bahtiar Effendy,5 Robert 
Hefner,6 Douglas Ramage,7 Martin van Bruinessen,8 and Masykuri 
                                                 
3 See his interviews “Representasi Umat Harus Diperjuangkan” in Arief Affandi, Islam 
Demokrasi Atas Bawah (Yogjakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), p. 122. 
4 Affandi, Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah, p. 124-125. 
5 Effendy, “Islam and the State,”. Although this study describes Islam-state relations 
since pre-Indonesian independence, it does not focus on democracy or 
democratization. The main focus of this study is the explanation of some socio-
political factors, which transformed the political attitudes of the New Order regime 
towards Islam.  
6 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia,” in Robert W. 
Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast 
Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). This article specifically deals with 
ICMI efforts on democratization in Indonesia. 
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Abdillah.9 However, none of these studies correlates the theories of 
democracy with religious interpretations (particularly to the issue of 
state-Islam relations), as expressed by the two major sides among 
Islamic groups. Although the polemic10 in Indonesian newspapers 
between May and June 1995 on state-Islam relations correlated to 
some extent the debate on Islam-state relations (particularly between 
Gus Dur and Amien Rais) with the discourse on democracy, it cannot 
be substitute for a comprehensive study. 
This study not only discusses the discourse on democracy within 
the larger debate on Islam-state relations in Indonesia, but also 
correlates the religious approach with the theories of democracy. For 
the purpose of this study, I will describe briefly the types of democracy 
formulated by some political scientists. This will help us classify the 
Islamic groups’ efforts in the process of democratization in Indonesia. 
I will then probe into these groups’ views of democracy and 
democratization and their classification, depending on their religious 
approach. Since Islamic doctrines may be said to support the most 
varied of political outlooks, including democracy,11 this study will 
                                                                                                      
7 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995). Ramage discusses both ICMI’s and 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s political concepts of democracy and democratization. 
However, he concentrates on Pancasila as a Indonesian state ideology. Likewise, he 
does not try to correlate their political concepts of democracy and democratization 
with their respective religious approaches. 
8 M. van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations in contemporary Indonesia; 1915-1990,” 
in C. van Dijk and A.H. de Groot (eds.), State and Islam (Leiden: Research School 
CNWS, 1995). This article briefly portrays Islam-state relations in Indonesia from an 
historical perspective. Instead of focusing on debate on political thoughts, it merely 
deals with institutional relations like shari’a-state relations and Muslim parties-
government relations. 
9 Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy  
(Hamburg: Abera Network Austronesia, 1997). This book emphasizes the theological 
perspective, describing Muslim intellectuals’ doctrinal responses to democratic ideas. 
However, Abdillah does not sketch empirically the debates on Islam-state relations in 
Indonesia in the light of the theories of democracy. 
10 The polemic initially triggered by Arief Affandi’s article in Jawa Pos Daily involved 
twelve participants and is documented in Arief Affandi, Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah: 
Polemik Strategi Perjuangan Umat Model Gus Dur dan Amien Rais (Yogjakarta: Pustaka 
Pelajar, 1996). 
11 John L. Esposito acknowledged this point. He said, “History has shown that nations 
and religious traditions are capable of having multiple and major ideological 
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consider both the debate on Islam-state relations and their respective 
commitment to democracy as a competitive process over the 
interpretation of the predominant Islamic doctrine among the silent 
majority of the people. The challenge to Islamic doctrine in Indonesia 
had already appeared in early the 20th century, well before 
independence. 
This study will also explore the role which Islam should play in the 
process of democratization. This role depends on what kind of Islam is 
compatible with democracy and democratization. I will argue that the 
compatibility of Islam with democracy and democratization in the 
modern sense depends on the identification with universal values 
(human rights, non-discrimination, and inclusion). 
The Types of Democracy 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan explained that, attitudinally, 
democracy became “the only game in town”, when the overwhelming 
majority of people believe that any further political change must 
emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas.12 
The question is, What precisely are the parameters of democratic 
formulas? Are democratic procedures the only parameters, as they 
claim? Are democratic principles also parameters? Since political 
scientists like Linz and Stepan do not appear to regard democratic 
principles as parameters, it is understandable that most young 
democratic states in the Third World tend to have a formal 
understanding of democracy, and thus pay little attention to the 
substantive meaning of democracy. This implies pseudo-democracy; a 
mere theatrical prop held up to reassure the world that the state 
continued to respect the basic rules of democracy. 
                                                                                                      
interpretations or reorientations. indeed, democracy itself has had multiple meanings 
for different people at different times, from ancient to modern notions of democracy, 
from direct to indirect democracy, from majority rule to majority vote. The Judeo-
Christian tradition, which once supported political absolutism and divine right 
monarchies, was reinterpreted to accommodate the democratic ideal. Islam also lends 
itself to multiple interpretations; it has been used to support democracy and 
dictatorship, republicanism and monarchy. The twentieth century has witnessed both 
tendencies.” Cf. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? p. 242. 
12 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 5. 
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This kind of democratic parameters, I think, is no longer 
applicable, since it is generally felt that democratic parameters should 
include both democratic procedures and democratic principles.13  In 
the light of these distinguished parameters, the types of Third World 
democracy that Robert Pinkney presents appear quite relevant to this 
discussion. Pinkney introduced five types of democracy: radical 
democracy, guided democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy, 
and consociational democracy.14 I will refer to only two of them for 
the purpose of this study: radical and liberal, since both of these depict 
well the discourse of democracy in Indonesia. 
Radical democracy. Society here is seen as an aggregate of individuals. 
Its objective is to enable these undifferentiated individuals to exercise 
their rights and protect their interests as active participants in the 
political arena. Citizens’ rights are protected to the extent that all are 
equal before the law, but the protection of the individual against the 
power of the state is less loudly articulated than in a liberal democracy.  
As the will of the majority is supreme, the role of the state is to execute 
that will. “Even if the method of establishing the will of the majority is 
impeccably democratic, problems remain with regard to the positions 
of minorities, whether they are permanent minorities such as a 
particular ethnic or religious group.”15 
Liberal democracy. This type of democracy recognizes society as an 
aggregate of diverse citizens acting as both individuals and members of 
groups. It aims at securing the representation of these individuals and 
groups, and protecting them from other groups and the state. Since 
liberal democracy considers society autonomous from the state, there 
is a clearer separation between the state and the society than in radical 
                                                 
13 I distinguished here the democratic parameters between their procedures and 
principles. The democratic procedures consist of institutions and rules like the 
parliament and the elections; while the democratic principles contain values and moral 
purposes (such equality, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination. 
14 Pinkney’s classification partly derived from the work of Dodd (1979) and Sklar 
(1983). After dismissing Dodd’s “direct democracy” and Sklar’s “participatory 
democracy”, Pinkney offers a table of a fivefold classification and summarizes the 
features of each type of democracy in terms of objectives, conceptions of society, the 
role of the state, the political process, citizens rights, citizen participation, and the 
practical problems to which each type gives rise. Cf. Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the 
Third World, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994). 
15 Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, p. 8. 
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democracy. The role of the state in this type of democracy is not as 
executor of the general will or the will of majority, but rather as a 
referee to ensure the representation and protection of diverse 
interests.16 
There are three obvious differences between these two types. First, 
liberal democracy places more emphasis than radical democracy on the 
protection of the rights and interests of individuals or groups. Second, 
society is more autonomous from the state in liberal democracy than in 
radical democracy. Third, the role of the state is more dominant in 
radical democracy than in liberal democracy. In sum, we may say that 
radical democracy is concentrated on the institutions or rules of 
democracy, while liberal democracy is more concentrated on the values 
or principles of democracy. 
In Indonesia, the radical type of democracy reflects those who 
have a formal understanding of democracy, and I will call this type 
henceforth “formalist democracy”.17 On the other hand, liberal 
democracy reflects those who understand democracy in terms of 
substantive principles. Accordingly, they should be called ‘substantialist 
democracy’. This formalist-substantialist classification of democratic 
types may not be completely satisfactory, but a generalization is 
needed, given the intricate complexity of the Islamic democratic 
movement in Indonesia.  
Democracy and Islamic Interpretation Approach  
Since the concept of democracy actually stems from Western 
countries (outside Islam), there is no consensus among Muslims on 
how to respond to democracy. There have been at least three kinds of 
Muslim responses. First is “total rejection”. Those who advocate this 
response believe that democracy has not originated from Islamic 
doctrine. This response is not really relevant to this study, as it does 
not welcome democracy. Only the other two will be discussed in the 
following section. The second response has been ‘”critical acceptance”, 
with the understanding that democracy does not contradict Islamic 
precepts, even the adherents of this view hold that some Islamic 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 10. 
17 Douglas M. Brown said that radical democracy, in terms of its theoretical derivation, 
is the radicalization of formal democracy. Cf. Douglas M. Brown, Towards a Radical 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the Budapest School (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 
134.  
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teachings, like shu >ra > (consultation) and ijma>`  (consensus), parallel 
democracy. The third is “complete acceptance”, based on the 
realization that democracy in its entirety, as practised in the developed 
countries, is the only solution that ensures the welfare of all human 
beings⎯to use Huntington’s phrase, “as the final form of human 
government”.18  
According to those who advocate critical acceptance, both Islamic 
doctrine and its history have provided the model of the state and the 
government based on democracy (that is, shu>ra> (consultation), ijma>`  
(consensus), and ijtiha>d (individual discretion). They further hold that 
shu>ra>, as an Islamic concept and principle, does not differ from 
democracy. Sadek J. Sulaiman offered at least five similarities between 
shu>ra> and democracy. First, both shu >ra > and democracy arise from the 
central consideration that collective deliberation is more likely to lead 
to a fair and sound result for the social good than individual 
preference. Second, both concepts assume that a majority judgment 
tends to be more comprehensive and accurate than minority judgment. 
Third, shu>ra> and democracy proceed from the core idea that all people 
are equal in rights and responsibilities. Fourth, both concepts thereby 
commit to the rule of the people through application of the law, rather 
than the rule of individuals or family through autocratic decree. Fifth, 
both affirm that a more comprehensive fulfilment of the principles and 
values by which humanity prospers cannot be achieved in a non-
democratic, non-shu >ra> environment.19 
 “The logic of shu>ra>,” Sulaiman explains, “like the logic of 
democracy, does not accept hereditary rule, for wisdom and 
competence are never the monopoly of any one individual or family.”20 
Likewise, shu>ra> and democracy both reject government by force, for 
any rule sustained by coercion is illegitimate. Moreover, both forbid 
privileges ―political, social, economic― claimed on the basis of tribal 
lineage or social prestige.”21 This kind of response seems to accept 
                                                 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy for the Long Haul”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, 
no. 2 (2 April 1996), p. 4. 
19 Sadek J. Sulaiman, “Democracy and Shura,” in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: 
a Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 98. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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democracy because the latter has its roots in Islamic teachings, namely, 
shu>ra>. In other words, the more any system constitutionally, 
institutionally, and practically fulfils the principle of shu>ra>, the more 
Islamic that system is. 
Given the democratic types presented above, this kind of Islamic 
interpretation of democracy is closer to ‘formalist democracy’. This is 
because it perceives shu>ra> and democracy as merely the best 
instruments to realize the principles of justice, equality, and human 
dignity in the collective socio-political experience. This may also be 
viewed from its emphasis on the majority as a key concept of 
democracy. 
While in the preceding discussion we describe the characteristics of 
the critical acceptance response, which tends to be that of ‘formalist 
democracy’, the next response (complete acceptance) resembles 
“subtantialist democracy”. According to this response, while Islamic 
doctrine provided a set of guidelines that accommodate democratic 
concepts like shu>ra> and ijma >`, it also offered features that might hinder 
democracy (that is, the primacy of shari>`ah (Islamic law), the role of 
non-Muslims, and a tendency among the `ulama>’ (religious teachers) in 
Islamic political history to support authoritarian rule. For this reason, 
this response tends to accept democracy as it has been practised in 
Western democratic countries, rather than to recognize what has been 
called “Islamic democracy”. The supporters of this response seem to 
pay more attention to the substantive principles of democracy. Because 
they believe that both the primacy of shari >` ah and the role of non-
Muslims imply the negation of principles of democracy like equality 
before the law and freedom of expression, they may be categorized as 
a ‘substantialist democracy’. 
The above shows that both the critical and the complete 
acceptance of democracy acknowledge the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy. However, they differ on the priority of democracy. The 
critical acceptance of democracy focuses on the factors for democracy 
in Islamic precepts; while the complete acceptance response gives 
preference to the factors against democracy in Islamic doctrine. 22 
                                                 
22 Here I borrow “the factors within Islam that work for and against democracy” from 
Daniel E. Price, Islamic Political Culture, Democracy and Human Rights: A Comparative Study  
(Westport: Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), pp. 27-28. 
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The description above, once again, clearly proves that the issue of 
the compatibility of Islam and democracy is one of contest between 
different Islamic approaches. This has been unavoidable in the modern 
political history of Indonesia. The following discussion about the 
debates on Islam-state relations in Indonesia should clarify this issue. 
Debates on Islam-State Relations in Indonesia 
In his article on state-Islam relations in Indonesia (1915-1990), 
Martin van Bruinessen did not categorize the various periods. This is 
perhaps because he focused more on the state and Islam with respect 
to institutional relations (Islam party-state relations, the council of 
`ulama>’-New Order regime relations, the shari >` ah-state relations).23 
However, it may be said that the debate on Islam-state relations went 
through at least three phases. The first phase was the pre-
independence period (1915-1944). The second is the period of 
consolidation of independence period (1945-1966). The third was the 
period of the New Order regime (1967-1998). 
The First Phase 
The problem of Islam-state relations initially arose in 1918 with a 
debate between some activists of Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic 
Association)24 and Comite voor het Javaansche Nationalisme (The 
Committee for Javanese Nationalism). The latter criticized the former, 
insisting that politics and religion should be separated. Sarekat Islam 
activists rejected this opinion and argued that their movement was 
“Islamic nationalist”.25 
This debate continued among Sarekat Islam members only because, 
since 1917, Marxist ideological thinking began to be felt in Sarekat 
Islam. Effendy pointed out that the introduction of Marxism in Sarekat 
Islam led to conflict and division within the leadership of the 
organization, creating two factions: an Islamic and a Marxist faction. 
                                                 
23 Van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations in contemporary Indonesia; 1915-1990,” pp. 
96-112. 
24 Sarekat Islam was the first Islamic organization formed by HOS Tjokroaminoto. 
This association was intended to oppose not only the Chinese domination but all 
forms of humiliation experienced by the native people; it responded to the 
Christianization promoted by missionaries and the exploitation of the Dutch 
colonialists. Cf. M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali 
Press, 1983), p. 19. 
25 Deliar Noer, Pengantar ke Pemikiran Politik (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1983), p. 186. 
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This was especially true as both factions fought over control of the 
movement and the socialistic, revolutionary agenda.26 This division 
increased because of a theological-ideological rift. The leaders of the 
Islamic faction (Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, and Abdul Moeis) were 
“determined to stress Islam as the party’s ideology, and move along the 
lines of the Middle Eastern pan-Islamism. In contrast, Semaun and 
Darsono (the leaders of the Marxist faction) “favoured the elimination 
of religion from practical politics.”27 
The first serious debate on Islam-state relations took the form of a 
polemic between Soekarno (the leader of the Indonesian Nationalist 
Party at the time and later on the first president of Indonesia) and 
Mohammad Natsir (later the leader of the eminent Islamic party 
Masyumi) in the Panji Islam Journal [Banner of Islam] during the early 
1940s. The polemic was focused on the issue of whether politics and 
religion should be separated or not. Although some authors 
characterized this as a polemic between Islam and nationalism, this 
study views it as a contest between different Islamic approaches of 
Muslims, implicating diverse perceptions of democracy. This polemic 
was deliberately long described here, because it had been perceived as a 
prototype of debates on Islam-state relations along Indonesian history 
later on. 
The polemic originated with Soekarno’s writings which appreciated 
the political changes in Turkey, notably those carried out by Mustafa 
Kemal, who abolished the Islamic caliphate in the 1920s. Although 
Soekarno claimed that his writings were simply “thought 
contributions”, with special reference to the political changes in 
Turkey, it was believed that they showed how Soekarno’s opinion 
agreed with Kemal’s, or at least his concurrence with the developments 
in Turkey. This position generated critics like Natsir.28 
By and large, all Soekarno favoured the separation of Islam from 
the state. Soekarno concurred with the separation of Islam and the 
state in Turkey because there was no consensus among the ‘ulama 
about the unity of religion and state. To support his understanding, 
                                                 
26 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 70-71. 
27 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
28 Noer, Pengantar ke Pemikiran Politik, pp. 187-205. See also Effendy, “Islam and the 
State, ” pp. 80-89. 
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Soekarno referred to the opinion expressed by `Ali > `Abd al-Ra >ziq,29 
which according to Soekarno proved that “Muh}ammad was a 
Messenger of a religious calling, full of religiosity, untainted by a 
tendency to kingship or a call for worldly government, and also 
sterilized the intention to establish one caliphate or a head of Muslims 
community to conduct the state affairs.”30 
Obviously, Soekarno disagreed with the idea of a close link 
between Islam and the state, especially in a country whose population 
is not uniformly Muslim. For him, the idea would only create a sense 
of discrimination, particularly among non-Muslims:  
Thus reality shows us, that the principle of the unity of 
state and religion for a country, which its inhabitant is not 
100% Muslim, could not be in line with [the principle of] 
democracy. In such a country, there are only two 
alternatives; there are only two choices; the unity of state-
religion, but without democracy, or democracy, but the 
state is separated from religion.”31 
This does not mean that Soekarno rejected Islamic doctrine. 
According to him, Islamic precepts may be included in government 
policies through parliamentary consensus. Since Muslims in Indonesia 
are a majority, “they would be able to set and determine the state 
agenda, resulting ultimately in the formulation of policy decisions 
imbued with Islamic values. Thus for Soekarno, the authenticity of an 
“Islamic state” was found not so much in the formal or legal adoption 
of Islam as the ideological and constitutional basis of the state, but 
more on the personal and mass manifestation of the “flame” and the 
“spirit” of Islam in the state policies.”32 
                                                 
29 Ali Abd al-Raziq (Egypt, 1888-1966) was a judge and academic at the Al-Azhar 
University Cairo. In 1925, he published a book entitled al-Islam wa Usul al Hukm [Islam 
and the foundation of the government]. In this book, he argued that Islam does not 
specify any particular form of government, thus allowing Muslims to create democratic 
regimes. This reasoning may have been intended to undermine the Egyptian king’s 
claim to the caliphate in the wake of the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 by 
Mustafa Kemal. 
30 Panji Islam, no. 20 (20 Mei 1940), as recorded in Noer, Pengantar ke Pemikiran Politik, 
pp. 189-190. 
31 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” p. 81. 
32 Ibid., p.82. 
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Soekarno’s view is based on his substantial interpretation of Islam 
and democracy.  On the one hand, the permanent and universal nature 
of Islam, according to Soekarno, required its adherents to understand 
Islamic doctrines (especially those concerning issues of a societal 
nature) beyond their textual appearances. It is only through such 
endeavour that Muslims could grasp the “flame” or “spirit” of Islam in 
their encounters with modernity and the changing world. On the other 
hand, the unity of Islam and state in Indonesia, a multi-religious 
country, was viewed as undemocratic, because it implied the negation 
of democratic principles like equality before the law and freedom of 
expression. This admittedly proves that the substantial interpretation 
on Islam is analogous to ‘substantialist democracy’, as we have 
mentioned above. 
What was the response to Soekarno’s view? Contradicting 
Soekarno’s ideas was Natsir, who promoted the idea of unity between 
religion and the state. Effendy summarized his views as follows:  
Like many other Muslims, Natsir believed in the holistic 
nature of Islam. For him, Islam was not only ritual but 
comprised general principles for regulating relations 
between individual and society. Nonetheless, he was very 
much aware that the Qur’an and Muhammad traditions did 
not have “hands and legs” to make individuals faithful to 
the rules of Islam. Thus, in his view there was no doubt 
that Islam needed a viable instrument to make its 
injunctions operative, [that is, the state]…Given this 
perspective, Natsir was strongly of the opinion that Islam 
and the state were integrated religio-political entities. Natsir 
also recognized that Islam provided only general guidelines. 
A detailed prescription for how a state should be organized 
or structured rested in the ability of its leaders to conduct 
their own ijtihad (independent judgment) in order to meet 
the challenges of modernity, provided that such a task is 
carried out in a democratic manner.33 
This clearly shows that Natsir’s approach was very close to the 
formalistic interpretation, since he insisted on the traditionally close 
link between religion and the state. He expected the state to act as a 
means of support to Muslims in their application of Islamic precepts. 
Although Natsir’s views also involved democratic argument, they were 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 86. 
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typically (to use a term adopted for the purpose of this study) part of 
the critical acceptance of democracy. For Natsir, democracy should be 
defined as an anti-absolutist and anti-despotic doctrine. “Islam is non-
democracy 100% and also it is non-theocracy 100%. Islam is Islam.”34 
Although he acknowledged that there are some merits to democracy, 
democracy also had many weaknesses (e.g., the authoritarianism of a 
ruling party and nepotism). Because of his acceptance of democracy, 
he did not reject Soekarno’s suggestion that Indonesian Muslims 
should dominate the parliament. However, he found this suggestion 
irrelevant, since Islam embraced the majority of Indonesian 
inhabitants. For Natsir, Indonesia was automatically a Muslim country. 
The suggestion, he thought, might be suitable for Muslims who 
governed in a non-Muslim, democratic country.35  
In spite of there being many differences and views on this issue, 
both approaches should be identified as Islamic, and hence perfectly 
valid, since Islam is a poly-interpretable religion. To use Effendy’s 
phrase, “Even though at the most general level there is only one Islam, 
its form and expression vary from one Muslim individual to 
another.”36 Thus, one is not mistaken to say that the polemic was really 
a contest of Islamic approaches on Islam-state relations among 
Muslims. Unfortunately, during the next three decades (the second 
phase of the debate) the formalistic interpretation was perceived as the 
sole kind of Islamic approach, and hence became predominant, while 
the substantial interpretation was secular and then ignored. 
The Second Phase 
In the second phase of the debate, two events illustrate well the 
predominant formalistic interpretation of Muslims. The first happened 
at the meeting sessions preparing for Indonesian independence.37 
                                                 
34 Noer, Pengantar ke Pemikiran Politik, pp. 201-202. 
35 Ibid., pp. 201, 203. 
36 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” p. 5. 
37 Close to the defeat of the Japanese in the World War II, the so-called the Dokuritsu 
Zyunbi Tyoosakai (also known as Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI, or Investigatory Committee for the Efforts for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence) was set up. It consisted of both the 
supporters of Soekarno’s Islamic approach and the supporters of Natsir’s Islamic 
approach. Nonetheless, Natsir was not included in this committee, while Soekarno was 
a prominent figure in it. Based on my readings so far, historians and political observers 
have not explained why Natsir failed to join this committee. There was a fierce debate 
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Beside the ideological and constitutional basis of the state, other 
relevant issues were included in this debate, such as whether or not the 
president should be Muslim; whether or not Islam ought to be the 
state religion; the necessity of having the state apparatus and agencies 
for the implementation of Islamic law; and Friday as a national 
Holiday.38 From the details of Boland’s description of the discussions 
between the two blocs, it is apparent that both sides used democracy 
as an argument.39 However, it seemed that, in the terms used in this 
study, the substantialist bloc focused more on democracy than the 
formalist bloc. 
The second event took place after the 1955 elections, with the 
Constituent Assembly (Dewan Konstituante) debates from 1956 to 
1959. Several Islamic parties, like Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama, PSII, and 
Perti, joined together to propose Islam as the basis of the Indonesian 
state, while non-Islamic parties such as PNI, PKI, Parkindo, Murba, 
and others were united in their rejection of Islam as the basis of 
Indonesia and promoted Pancasila40 as their basis. Instead of 
presenting arguments based on democracy, both sides in this debate 
tended to give more theological and philosophical reasons in their 
arguments, especially since both sides interpreted Pancasila in 
                                                                                                      
in the committee on whether or not the new Republic of Indonesia should be founded 
on religion. The committee was divided into two blocs. On the one hand, there was 
the Islamic bloc, this time led by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, and A. Wahid Hasyim (who basically argued that, given the 
preponderant position of Islam in Indonesia, the state should be based on Islam. On 
the other hand, there was the nationalist bloc (actually many of them were Muslim, 
some authors referred to them as Nationalist to distinguish them from the other bloc), 
led by Soekarno, Hatta and Supomo (who maintained that for the sake of unity the 
state should be “deconfessionalized”, though by no means made irreligious in 
character). Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 91-92. 
38 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” p. 93. 
39 B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982). Particularly Chapter I. 
40 Pancasila is the Indonesian national ideology. In its simplest expression, Pancasila 
consists of the following five principles, which are included in the Preamble to the 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945: belief in God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, 
national unity, Indonesian democracy through consultation and consensus, and social 
justice. 
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accordance with their ideological frameworks or their beliefs.41 In 
Adnan Buyung Nasution’s assessment, “The debate was ideological, 
absolutist, and antagonistic, so that the parties did not come close to 
each other but on the contrary were driven farther apart”.42 
However, in Effendy’s study, we find that although theological and 
philosophical arguments predominated the debate, both sides also 
presented democratic arguments. But, it seems immediately that the 
supporters of Pancasila gave more democratic arguments rather than 
Islamic parties. Effendy said that the Islamic parties proposed that 
Islam should be adopted as the state ideology based on: (1) the holistic 
nature of Islam; (2) the superiority of Islam over other worldly 
ideologies; and (3) the fact that Islam was adhered to by the majority of 
the country’s population. 
So long as Pancasila remained the state ideology, its supporters 
argued that it was (1) comprised of Islamic (though not only Islamic) 
elements, (2) a common platform, given the heterogeneity of 
Indonesia’s religious community; (3) a viable ideological synthesis for 
those with different religious faiths; and (4) it would entail an image of 
constitutional discrimination if Islam become the basis of state.43 
Despite this, it is interesting to note how the leaders of the Islamic 
parties responded to the concept of democracy, particularly on the 
question of whether or not Islam had a political system. Zaenal Abidin 
Ahmad, a Masyumi figure, argued that parliamentary democracy was 
the ideal Islamic political system, where the concept of shu>ra> was fully 
integrated.44 Ma’arif further explained that all the Muslim leaders at the 
Constituent Assembly genuinely chose parliamentary democracy 
because it was the most compatible with the Islamic political ideal 
(although some were confused about how it related to the concept of 
God’s sovereignty.45 This shows that the idea of democracy among the 
                                                 
41 On this discussion, see A. Syafii Ma’arif, “Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the 
Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in 
Indonesia,” unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Illinois: University of Chicago, 1983. 
42 Adnan Buyung Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A 
Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 
n.y), p. 41. 
43 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 118-121. 
44 Ma’arif, “Islam as the Basis of State”, p. 252. 
45 Ibid., p. 253. 
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formalistic interpretation was not wholeheartedly understood; and this 
is why they could not accept it in its entirety. 
A point needs to be mentioned about democratic performance and 
the appreciation of democracy in the late Soekarno’s era. When 
President Soekarno introduced “Guided Democracy” replacing 
parliamentary democracy in 1959 and banned Masyumi in 1960, 
accusing it without proof of involvement in the rebellion, the leaders 
of Masyumi objected that this kind of democracy camouflaged 
authoritarian rule and therefore should be opposed. In this case, both 
the introduction of Guided Democracy and the liquidation of 
Masyumi by Soekarno had shifted positions. Now, Soekarno was 
pictured as authoritarian, while Masyumi, where Natsir was a leader, 
was viewed as pro-democracy.46 Nevertheless, Masyumi activists’ 
understanding of democracy remained formal. This may be seen as 
merely criticism due to Masyumi’s banning from the Indonesian 
political arena. 
Perhaps, it suffices to say that in this phase the discourse on 
democracy failed to translate well into practice. Indeed, there had been 
a miscarriage of democracy. Both the parliamentary democracy 
endorsed by Masyumi and the guided democracy introduced by 
Soekarno failed to give birth to true democracy. This may be due, 
according to Fachry Aly, to the characteristics of democracy, which to 
most Indonesian people appeared foreign, abstract, elitist, and not 
deeply anchored in their tradition.47 
However, Soekarno’s dictatorship in the guided-democracy era 
generated tensions between the state and Islam. Accordingly, it 
inevitably facilitated the formation of the robust existence of 
exclusively political Islam, which has a formalistic interpretation of 
Islam as one of its characteristics. Meanwhile, since the formalistic 
interpretation was conceived as the sole kind of Islamic interpretation, 
the substantial interpretation gradually disappeared from Indonesian 
political arena. This condition lasted until the early years of the New 
Order regime (1966-1998).  
                                                 
46 Ibid., pp. 295-296. 
47 Fachry Aly, “Keharusan Demokratisasi dalam Islam Indonesia”, in Nasrullah A. 
Fauzi (ed.), ICMI: Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 134. 
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The Third Phase 
While the Soekarno’s regime concentrated on political 
development through experimentation with guided democracy, the 
New Order regime under President Soeharto focused on economic 
development. Originally influenced by Rostow’s notion of a series of 
developmental stages leading to an economic and social take-off, this 
regime put economic development above all other policy 
considerations. As Sirajuddin Syamsuddin argued, the agenda under 
the New Order has included the depoliticization of Islam, since a 
politically powerful Islam had been viewed as a potential obstruction 
to modernization.48 
When the position of political Islam appeared to be worsening, 
particularly following the New Order’s manoeuvre to restructure 
Indonesia’s political format, many of its leaders became increasingly 
reactionary. Quoting Allan Samson, Effendy said that this signalled the 
inability of Islamic political activists to give an intelligent religio-
political response to these challenges. Effendy also interpreted this 
persistently inflexible religio-political behavior as an indication of their 
inability to relinquish their formalistic and legalistic approach in 
politics.49 
In the light of such a political setting, a few Muslims figures tried 
to revive the substantial interpretation of the relationship between 
Islam and the state. H.M.S. Mintaredja, chairman of Indonesian 
Muslim Party (Parmusi) thinks that Islam does not aim at the creation 
of an Islamic state. Syamsuddin says that, in Mintaredja’s view, “the 
duty of Muslims is to struggle to create a true Muslim society, which 
should be distinguished from an Islamic state.”50 It seemed to 
Syamsuddin that the core of Mintaredja’s idea is that there is to some 
extent a separation between state and “church” in Islam.51 
According to Fachry Aly, however, Mintaredja’s idea did not arise 
from theological reflections but rather due to the clashes between the 
state and Islam since Soekarno’s era. Hence, it sounds more political. 
                                                 
48 Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in 
Indonesian New Order, Ph.D. Dissertation. Los Angeles, University of California, 1991, 
p. 86. 
49 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 145-146. 
50 Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam, p. 97. 
51 Ibid., p. 98. 
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Aly asserted that Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian Muslim 
intellectual, was the only pioneer who reintroduced the substantial 
interpretation.52 
In view of the problematic of Indonesian Islam, which lies in the 
paradox between the defeat of politicized Islam and the rapid 
expansion of Islam, Madjid concluded that Islam’s quantitative growth 
was not encouraged by the Islamic parties, since the Islamic parties 
have failed to build a positive and sympathetic image of Islam.53 His 
slogan “Islam-Yes, Islamic Party-No” completely represented the 
substantial interpretation. Thus, Madjid’s ideas, according to 
Muhammad Kamal Hassan, constitute “an attempt to reformulate in 
general terms the fundamental Islamic postulates regarding God, man 
and the physical world, and the manner of their relationships in the 
light of new political realities”.54 What Madjid wanted to convey with 
these reinvigorative religio-political themes was not a proposal to 
revise the doctrine of Islam, but rather to urge Muslims adherents to 
rethink their understanding and interpretation of Islam. 
While Madjid’s theological concerns provoked many criticisms, it 
attracted some activists from some Islamic student organizations; such 
as HMI or PII particularly both in Jakarta and Yogjakarta, and later in 
the late 1980s were predominant in Muslim societies. Through lengthy 
discussion and intense discussions, it came out with a number of 
theology-politically conclusions. Effendy summarized their conclusions 
as below: 
First, there is no clear-cut evidence that the Qur’a>n and the 
Sunnah oblige Muslims to establish an Islamic state. 
Second, Islam does contain a set of socio-political 
principles. Even so, Islam is not an ideology. Third, 
Muslims understanding of Islam should not be confined to 
its formal and legal sense, since it is conceived as timeless 
                                                 
52 Aly, “Keharusan Demokratisasi”, p. 138. 
53 Nurcholish Madjid, “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and Rein-
vigorating Religious Understanding” in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: A 
Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 284-294. 
54 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization 
in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran 
Malaysia, 1982), p. 89. 
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and universal. Fourth, only Allah possesses the absolute 
truth.55 
Although democratic arguments are vague in the current theology-
political thought, it clearly showed an accommodative tendency with 
respect to the regime’s political policy.56 The regime welcomed this 
new dominant tendency, which it no longer perceived as a threat to its 
power. However, the lack of substantially democratic sentiment in this 
tendency implies to the “bewilderment”, particularly in the face of 
political cooptation by the authoritarian state through the foundation 
of a regime-sponsored organization Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia 
(ICMI) or the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals.57 
Unlike some Muslims who agreed with Madjid’s idea without 
presenting substantially democratic arguments, Abdurrahman Wahid 
                                                 
55 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 151-152. 
56 Madjid actually developed democratic arguments and stressed both their substantial 
and formal aspects, but some of his supporters seemed to focus on their formal 
meaning. This is perhaps due to Madjid’s elaborations of democracy, which are long 
on the process of democratization. See his “Cita-cita Politik Kita”, in Bosco Carvallo 
and Dasrizal (eds.), Aspirasi Umat Islam (Jakarta: Leppenas, 1983), pp. 16-21. 
57 ICMI was founded on 7 December 1990. There are at least three opinions 
concerning the founding of ICMI. First, Robert Hefner expressed the lenient view. He 
shrewdly portrayed the president’s public engagement with Islam as a “struggle to 
capture and direct the moral allegiance of urban middle class that has embraced this 
religion as their key source of ethical and spiritual guidance.” See Robert W. Hefner, 
“Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class,” Indonesia, no. 56 (1993), p. 2. The second opinion is the moderate view 
articulated by Kenneth George, who sees in ICMI’s founding two aspects of the New 
Order regime. One, its founding indicates that state intrusion has formally embraced 
Muslim intellectuals, giving them the authority and influence ordinarily enjoyed by the 
ulamas, and other Muslim clerics in discussing social, cultural, and religious life. Two, 
the state inserted itself into the public sphere as a religious authority of sorts: it offered 
judgments upon and the legitimasization of the role of religion in civic affairs and the 
daily life of citizens. Cf. Kenneth George, “Designs on Indonesia’s Muslim 
Communities”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 57, no. 3 (August 1998), p. 699. The 
third opinion was the fiercely critical view of William Liddle, who argued that ICMI is 
not an autonomous organization that represents the political interests of the Muslim 
community. Rather, it is a state corporatist organization, dominated by high officials 
beholden to President Soeharto and designed to advance his control of the political 
system through the 1997 elections and 1998, when the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) were to have selected the country’s president. Cf. 
William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, Journal of 
Asian Studies, vol. 55, no. 3 (August 1996), p. 625. 
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argued that Islam needed to accept plurality and to accommodate 
indigenous and local circumstances. This point allowed Wahid to 
advocate the notions of: (1) Islam as a complementary factor in 
Indonesia’s socio-cultural and political life, and (2) the indigenisation 
or contextualization of Islam.58 The peculiarity of Wahid’s notions laid 
in his regarding that the ideal form is not an Islamic society even less 
an Islamic state, but an Indonesian society where Muslims and non-
Muslims share the same advantages. So, his main concern is actually 
about the equality of rights and obligations among Indonesia’s existing 
socio-political communities ―assuming that Pancasila is the nation’s 
ideological compromise. This view is quite different from that of 
Muslims who think that the ideal Indonesian society is a society where 
Muslims dominate the political scene (for example, by having a right to 
the presidency), just because they are the majority.59 
In the light of these divergences among the supporters of the 
substantial interpretation, it is understandable that many of them could 
accept to join ICMI. Yet, due to his peculiarly democratic arguments, 
Wahid refused to join ICMI since he viewed its establishment as 
leaning towards sectarianism and exclusivist. He believed that 
intellectuals should not organize themselves based on narrow 
categories like Islamic faith, since they gave the impression of being 
too eager to monopolize all social and political functions in the 
country. In this sense, Wahid’s resistance to subordination to the state 
and his demand for the inclusion of all citizens into national political 
structures pointed to democratization. 
In response to Wahid, some prominent figures of ICMI contended 
that the new organization was the most appropriate and effective 
means to serve the Muslim community and to seek greater 
democratization in Indonesia. For many ICMI activists, the existence 
of ICMI provided the opportunity to advance the cause of Islam and 
to realize an Islamic society. They also argued that the organization 
could be an effective means of advocating the creating a robust civil 
society by “de-militarizing” Indonesian politics. Adi Sasono, General 
Secretary of ICMI since 1995, for example, argued that the key issues 
                                                 
58 Effendy, “Islam and the State,” pp. 165-166. 
59 On Wahid’s political thoughts, see Mujiburrahman, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia: 
The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 
vol. 10, no.3, 1999. pp. 339-352; Cf. also Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, particularly 
chapter 2. 
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for ICMI were democratization and an eventual reduction in the 
military’s political role. He explained that a more democratic society 
would mean a reduction in the military’s political role.60 
Besides their different views of democratization, they differed in 
how they thought Islam-state relations should be like. According to 
Dawam Rahardjo, vice-chairman of the Experts Board of ICMI, the 
integration of the state and Muslim community was the underpinning 
for the process of democratization, because with such integration no 
obstacle existed any longer for Muslim participation in modernity and 
development.61 Meanwhile, Wahid was emphatic that the power of the 
government should never be used either on behalf of or against any 
particular religion.62 It is clear that Rahardjo merely pointed to the 
Muslim community as the majority; while Wahid pointed to all citizens 
without discrimination or privilege. With respect to the categories 
outlined in this study, the different opinions above indicate both 
‘formalist democracy’ (ICMI activists) and ‘subtantialist democracy’ 
(Wahid). 
Based on the above, I think, the substantial interpretation or 
‘substantialist democracy’ is more compatible with genuine democracy 
than the formalistic interpretation or ‘formalist democracy’. In this 
case, Aly’s viewpoint appropriately portrayed the failure of ‘formalist 
democracy’ to accelerate the process of democratization in Indonesia. 
According to him, the foundation of ICMI unofficially institutionalized 
the unity of Islam and the state, which barred the way to a vigorous 
civil society and more democratization in Indonesia.63 By saying so, 
Aly was not actually criticizing ICMI, but rather expressing his hope of 
seeing ICMI become the pioneer of democratization in Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, far from striving to craft a democracy, ICMI failed even 
to object to the banning of the press by the new Order regime in 1994, 
which clearly contradicted a principal tenet of democracy: freedom of 
                                                 
60 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp. 96-97, 114. Actually I was eager to explain in depth 
the contemporary political debate between ICMI and its effort of democratization and 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s effort on the same subject. Increasingly, this debate involves 
the discourse of civil society. However, this lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
61 Dawam Rahardjo, “Responsi ICMI terhadap Aspirasi Kerakyatan” paper presented 
in ICMI National Conference, Jakarta, 9 September 1995. p. 10. 
62 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p. 62. 
63 Aly, “Keharusan Demokratisasi”, pp. 141-2.  
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the press. This may show us the dilemmas of a ‘formalist democracy’ 
close to the seat of power. 
Conclusion  
It may be said that the two different emphases on democracy 
above parallel the debate among scholars of democratization, which 
Huntington referred to, between the ‘crafting’ camp versus 
‘preconditions’ camp. According to Huntington, the former held that 
democratization was primarily the product of political actors who have 
the will and the skill to bring it about; the latter argued that movement 
towards democracy depended on the existence of particular social, 
economic, or cultural preconditions.64 
From this perspective, ‘formalist democracy’ is similar to the 
crafting camp while ‘substantialist democracy’ parallels the precon-
ditions camp. Within an Indonesian context, the debate between the 
crafting and preconditions camps represented a dichotomy in the 
appreciation of the factors within Islam that work for and against 
democracy. The crafting camp seems to ignore certain preconditions: it 
believes that since Islam has the elements that make for democracy, 
the ideal condition of democracy may be crafted later. 
On the other hand, the preconditions camp seems unconvinced 
that the factors within Islam could successfully work for democracy, 
because some factors inherent in Islam may preclude democracy. 
Accordingly, it is inclined to begin with a reinterpretation of Islamic 
doctrine in order to reconcile it with democratization (recasting and 
expanding the traditional doctrine regarding the status dhimmi > of non-
Muslim minorities), and then demanding certain preconditions, like the 
guarantee that all human beings be treated equally, and there be non-
discrimination. 
A significant lesson from the Indonesian discourses on democracy 
is as follows. If the ideal conditions of “Islamic democracy” are to be 
constructed, it would attempt to reinterpret the factors within Islam 
that stand against democracy. As long as this is never realized in 
Muslim countries, the promotion of a democratic process in the 
Muslim world may pose only risks and may lead, as Esposito says, to 
                                                 
64 Huntington, “Democracy For The Long Haul”, p. 4. 
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the “hijacking of democracy” by Islamic fundamentalist groups 
committed to antidemocratic ideologies at the centre of power.65 
Another important point is that “Islamic democracy” in Muslim 
countries is better posited as a complement, not an alternative, to what 
we may call genuine democracy, as practised in many democratic 
countries. This is critical, having become a determining factor of 
whether Islam-democracy relations are compatible or not. And finally, 
to put “Islamic democracy” in complementary position eventually will 
prove that democracy is universalizable, thus, confirm that Islam is a 
universal religion.[] 
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